Abstract. We put forward a new technique to construct very efficient and compact signature schemes. Our technique combines several instances of only a mildly secure signature scheme to obtain a fully secure scheme. Since the mild security notion we require is much easier to achieve than full security, we can combine our strategy with existing techniques to obtain a number of interesting new (stateless and fully secure) signature schemes. Concretely, we get (1) A scheme based on the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption in pairing-friendly groups. Signatures contain O(1) and verification keys O(log k) group elements, where k is the security parameter. Our scheme is the first fully secure CDH-based scheme with such compact verification keys. (2) A scheme based on the (nonstrong) RSA assumption in which both signatures and verification keys contain O(1) group elements. Our scheme is significantly more efficient than existing RSA-based schemes. (3) A scheme based on the Short Integer Solutions (SIS) assumption. Signatures contain O(log(k)·m) and verification keys O(n ·m)Z p -elements, where p may be polynomial in k, and n, m denote the usual SIS matrix dimensions. Compared to state-of-the-art SIS-based schemes, this gives very small verification keys, at the price of slightly larger signatures. In all cases, the involved constants are small, and the arising schemes provide significant improvements upon state-of-the-art schemes. The only price we pay is a rather large (polynomial) loss in the security reduction. However, this loss can be significantly reduced at the cost of an additive term in signature and verification key size.
Introduction
Generic and Non-generic Signature Schemes Digital signature schemes can be built from any one-way function [24, 27, 28] . However, this generic construction is not particularly efficient. (For instance, each signature contains O(k 2 ) preimages.) One could hope that for concrete assumptions (such as the RSA or Diffie-Hellman-related assumptions), it is possible to derive much more efficient schemes.
Tree-Based Signatures Although indeed there exists a variety of efficient signature schemes from concrete assumptions, there are surprisingly few different technical paradigms. For instance, early RSA-based signature schemes (such as [11, 12, 16] ) follow a tree-based approach, much similar to the generic construction from [27, 28] . Also later schemes (e.g., [13] and its variants [14, 17, 22] , or [20] ) can at least be seen as heavily inspired by earlier tree-based schemes. For instance, [13] can be seen as a more efficient variant of the scheme from [12] with an extremely flat tree, at the price of a stronger computational assumption. On the other hand, the scheme from [20] can be viewed as a tree-based scheme in which signatures are aggregated and thus become very compact.
Partitioning Strategies A second class of signature schemes tries to enable a "partitioning strategy" during the security proof (e.g., [6, 9, 17, 34] ). (This means that during the security proof, the set of messages is partitioned into those that can be signed by the simulator, and those that cannot.) At least outside of the random oracle model, currently known instantiations of partitioning strategies rely on certain algebraic structures, and lead to comparatively large public keys.
More Specific Schemes Finally, there are a number of very efficient signature schemes (e.g., [5, 33] ) with specific requirements. For instance, the scheme of [5] relies on a specific (and somewhat nonstandard) computational assumption, and the scheme of [33] inherently requires a decisional (as opposed to a search) assumption. While we focus on the standard model, we note that there are also very efficient schemes with a heuristic proof, i.e., a proof in the random oracle model (e.g., [2] ).
Our Contribution
In this work, we present a new paradigm for the construction of efficient signature schemes from standard computational assumptions.
The Technical Difficulty
We believe that one of the main difficulties in constructing signature schemes is the following. Namely, in the standard security experiment for digital signatures, an adversary A wins if it generates a signature for a (fresh) message of his own choice. If we use A in a straightforward way as a problem-solver in a security reduction to a computational assumption, then A itself may select which instance of the particular problem it is going to solve (by choosing the forgery message). Note that we cannot simply guess which instance A is going to solve, since there usually will be superpolynomially many possible messages (and thus problem instances). 1 Our Main Idea We now explain the main idea behind our approach. As a stepping stone, we introduce a very mild form of security for signature schemes that is much easier to achieve than full (i.e., standard) security. Intuitively, the mild security experiment forces an adversary to essentially commit to a crucial part of the forgery before even seeing the verification key. During a security reduction, this allows us to embed a computational problem into the verification key that is tailored specifically to the adversary's forgery. In particular, we do not have to rely on strong assumptions to achieve mild security. Indeed, we present very efficient mildly secure schemes based on the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption (in pairing-friendly groups), the RSA assumption, and the Short Integer Solutions (SIS) assumption. These constructions are basically stripped-down versions of known (fully secure) stateful [21] and stateless [6] schemes.
The heart of our work is a very simple and efficient construction of a fully secure signature scheme from log(k) instances of a mildly secure one. Note that we only use logarithmically many mildly secure instances. In contrast, the related-but technically very different-prefix-guessing technique of Hohenberger and Waters [7, 20, 27] , uses k instances of a "less secure" scheme. Furthermore, the signature schemes that result from our transformation can often be optimized (e.g., using aggregation of signatures or verification keys). Concretely, if we use our transformation on the mildly secure schemes mentioned above, and optimize the result, then we end up with extremely efficient new signature schemes from standard assumptions.
More on Our Techniques
We now explain our transformation in a little more detail. We start out with a tag-based signature scheme that satisfies only a very mild form of security. In a tag-based signature scheme, signatures carry a tag t that can be chosen freely during signature time. In our mild security experiment, the adversary A must initially (i.e., nonadaptively) specify all messages M i it wants signed, along with corresponding pairwise different tags t i . After receiving the verification key and the requested signatures, A is then expected to forge a signature for a fresh message M * , but with respect to a "recycled" tag t * = t i (that was already used for one of the initially signed messages).
Mild security thus forces A to choose the tag t * of his forgery from a small set {t i } i of possible tags. In a security proof, we can simply guess t * = t i with significant probability, and embed a computational problem that is specifically tailored toward t * into the verification key. 2 How this embedding is done depends on the specific setting; for instance, in the CDH setting, t * can be used to program a Boneh-Boyen hash function [4] . In fact, Hohenberger and Waters [21] use such a programming to construct a very efficient stateful signature scheme. 1 There are cleverer ways of embedding a computational problem into a signature scheme (e.g., partitioning [9, 34] ). These techniques, however, usually require special algebraic features such as homomorphic properties or pairing-friendly groups. For instance, partitioning is not known to apply in the (standard-model) RSA setting. 2 Since we guess t * from a small set of possible tags, we call our technique "confined guessing."
A signature in our fully secure scheme consists of log(k) signatures (σ i )
of a mildly secure scheme. (In some cases, these signatures can be aggregated.) The i-th signature component σ i is created with tag chosen as uniform 2 i -bit string. Hence, tagcollisions (i.e., multiply-used tags) are likely to occur after a few signatures in instances with small i, while instances with larger i will almost never have tag-collisions.
We will reduce the (full) security of the new scheme generically to the mild security of the underlying scheme. When reducing a concrete (full) adversary B to a mild adversary A, we will first single out an instance i * such that (a) the set of all tags is polynomially small (so we can guess the i * -th challenge tag t * i * in advance), and (b) tag-collisions occur only with sufficiently small (but possibly nonnegligible) probability in an attack with A (so only a constant number of t * i * -signatures will have to be generated for A). This instance i * is the challenge instance, and all other instances are simulated by A for B. 3 Any valid forgery of B must contain a valid signature under instance i * with 2 i * -bit tag. Hence, any B-forgery implies an A-forgery.
The bottleneck of our transformation is the security reduction. Concretely, if B makes q signature queries and forges with success probability ε, then A will make up to Q = O(q 4 /ε) signature queries and have success ε/2. (One "squaring" is caused by a birthday bound when hoping for few tag-collisions; another squaring may occur when we have to round i * up to the next integer.) This security loss is annoying, but can be significantly reduced by using techniques from [17] . In other words, by first applying a suitable "weakly programmable" hash function to tags, we can allow m-fold tag-collisions in the signatures prepared for B, at the cost of an extra m group elements in verification key and signatures. Orthogonally, we can use c i -bit tags with 1 < c < 2 (instead of 2 i -bit tags) in the i-th mildly secure instance to get a "finer-grained" growth of possible tag sets. This costs a multiplicative factor of 1/ log 2 (c) in verification key and signature size, unless of course aggregation is possible. With these measures, the security reduction improves considerably: A will make Q = O(q c+c/m /ε c/m ) signature queries and have success ε/2. Varying c and m gives thus an interesting tradeoff between efficiency and quality of the security reduction.
Efficiency Comparison
The most efficient previous CDH-based signature scheme [34] has signatures and public keys of size O(1), resp. O(k) group elements. Our CDH-based scheme also has constant-sized signatures, and more compact public keys. Concretely, we can get public keys of O(log(k)) group elements at the price of a worse security reduction. Our RSA-based scheme has similar key and signature sizes as existing RSAbased schemes [18, 20] , but requires significantly fewer (i.e., only O(log(k)) instead of O(k), resp. O(k/ log(k)) many) generations of large primes. Again, this improvement is bought with a worse security reduction. Our SIS-based scheme offers an alternative to the existing scheme of [6] . Concretely, our scheme has larger (by a factor of log(k)) signatures and a worse security reduction, but significantly smaller (by a factor of k/ log(k)) public keys.
On a Related Result by Seo
In an independent work, Seo [30] constructs essentially the same CDH-based scheme, however, with a very different security analysis. His analysis is much tighter than ours, and for concrete security parameters, his scheme is more efficient. At the same time, Seo only proves a bounded form of security in which the number of adversarial signature queries has to be known at the time of key generation. The merged paper [3] presents both his and our own analysis.
Preliminaries
Notation For n ∈ R, let [n] := {1, . . . , n }. Throughout the paper, k ∈ N denotes the security parameter. For a finite set S, we denote by s ← S the process of sampling s uniformly from S. For a probabilistic algorithm A, we write y ← A(x) for the process of running A on input x with uniformly chosen random coins, and assigning y the result. If A's running time is polynomial in k, then A is called probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT). A function f : N → R ≥0 is negligible if it vanishes faster than the inverse of any polynomial (i.e., if
On the other hand, f is significant if it dominates the inverse of some polynomial (i.e., if ∃c, Pseudorandom Functions For any set S, a pseudorandom function (PRF) with range S is an efficiently computable function:
with key κ ∈ {0, 1} k . In addition, we require that Chameleon Hashing A chameleon hash scheme consists of two PPT algorithms (CHGen, CHTrapColl). CHGen(1 k ) outputs a tuple (CH, τ ) where CH is the description of a efficiently computable chameleon hash function CH : M × R → N which maps a message M and randomness r to a hash value CH(M, r ). We require collision-resistance in the sense that it is infeasible to find (M, r ) = (M , r ) with CH(M, r ) = CH(M , r ). However, the trapdoor τ allows us to produce collisions in the following sense: given arbitrary M, r, M , CHTrapColl(τ, M, r, M ) finds r with CH(M, r ) = CH(M , r ). We require that the distribution of r is uniform given only CH and M .
Tag-Based Signatures: From Mild to Full Security
We now describe our main result: a generic transformation from mildly secure tag-based signature schemes to fully secure schemes. Let us first define the notion of tag-based signature schemes. Definition 3.1. A tag-based signature scheme SIG t = (Gen t , Sig t , Ver t ) with message space M k and tag space T k consists of three PPT algorithms. The key generation algorithm (pk, sk) ← Gen t (1 k ) takes as input a security parameter and outputs a key pair (pk, sk). The signing algorithm σ ← Sig t (sk, M, t) computes a signature σ on input a secret key sk, message M, and tag t. The verification algorithm Ver t (pk, M, σ, t) ∈ {0, 1} takes as input a public key pk, message M, signature σ , and a tag t, and outputs a bit. For correctness, we require for
We define a mild security notion for tag-based schemes, dubbed EUF-dnaCMA * m security, which requires an adversary F to initially specify all (distinct) messages M i it wants signed, along with corresponding tags t i . Only then, F gets to see a public key, and is subsequently expected to produce a forgery for an arbitrary fresh message M * , but with respect to an already used tag t * ∈ {t i } i . As a slightly technical (but crucial) requirement, we only allow F to initially specify at most m messages M i with tag t i = t * . We call m the tag-collision parameter; it influences key and signature sizes, and the security reduction. (k) is defined in Fig. 2 .
In this section, we will show how to use a EUF-dnaCMA * m secure scheme SIG t to build an EUF-dnaCMA secure scheme SIG. (Full EUF-CMA security can then be achieved using a chameleon hash function [23] .)
To this end, we separate the tag space T k into l := log c (k) pairwise disjoint sets T i , such that |T i | = 2 c i . Here, c > 1 is a granularity parameter that will affect key and signature sizes, and the security reduction. For instance, if c = 2 and T k = {0, 1} k , then we may set T i := {0, 1} 2 i . The constructed signature scheme SIG assigns to each κ (M). The PRF seed κ is part of SIG's public key. 4 A SIG-signature is of the form
is a signature according to SIG t with message M and tag t i . This signature is considered valid if all σ i are valid w.r.t. SIG t .
The crucial idea is to define the sets T i of allowed tags as sets quickly growing in i. This means that (m + 1)-tag-collisions (i.e., the same tag t i being chosen for m + 1 different signed messages) are very likely for small i, but become quickly less likely for larger i.
Concretely, let SIG t = (Gen t , Sig t , Ver t ) be a tag-based signature scheme with tag space
T i , let m ∈ N and c > 1, and let PRF be a PRF. SIG is described in Fig. 3 .
It is straightforward to verify SIG's correctness. Before turning to the formal proof, we first give an intuition into why SIG is EUF-dnaCMA secure. We will map an adversary F on SIG's EUF-dnaCMA security to an adversary F on SIG t 's EUF-dnaCMA * m security. Intuitively, F will internally simulate the EUF-dnaCMA security experiment for F and embed its own SIG t -instance (with public key pk ) in the SIG-instance of F by setting pk := (pk , κ). In addition, the seed κ for PRF is chosen internally by F .
Say that F makes q = q(k) (non-adaptive) signing requests for messages M 1 , . . . , M q . To answer these q requests, F can obtain signatures under pk from its own EUF-dnaCMA * m experiment. The corresponding tags are chosen as in SIG, as t
as its own forgery. Indeed, σ * i * will be a valid SIG t -forgery (in the EUF-dnaCMA * m experiment) if (a) F did not initially request signatures for more than m messages for the forgery tag t * i * ; and (b) t * i * already appears in one of F 's initial signature requests. Our technical handle to make this event likely will be a suitable choice of i * . First, recall that the i-th signature σ i uses c i -bit tags. We will hence choose i * such that (i) the probability of an (m + 1)-tag-collision among the t ( j) i * is significantly lower than F's success probability (so F will sometimes have to forge signatures when no (m + 1)-tag collision occurs), and 4 It will become clear in the security proof that actually a function with weaker security properties than a fully secure PRF is sufficient for our application. However, we stick to standard PRF security for simplicity. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
(ii) |T i * | = 2 c i * is polynomially small (so all tags in T i * can be initially queried by F ).
We turn to a formal proof: 
(where the probability is over independently chosen t ( j) i * ← T i * ), and such that |T i * | is polynomial in k. 5 We will prove in Lemma 3.5 that
is an index that fulfills these conditions. F then chooses a PRF key κ ← {0,
l ) to denote the SIG-signature for message M j , for all j ∈ {1, . . . , q}. Adversary F uses its signing oracle provided from the SIG t -security experiment to simulate these SIG-signatures. To this end, it proceeds as follows.
In order to simulate all signatures σ ( j) i
). F will later request signatures for these (l−1)·q message-tag pairs from its EUF-dnaCMA * m -challenger. Note that t
∈ T i * for all i = i * , since the sets T 1 , . . . , T l are pairwise disjoint. 5 There is a subtlety here, since we assume to know ε(k). To obtain a black-box reduction, we can guess log 2 (ε(k)) which would result in an additional security loss of a factor k in the reduction.
To compute the i * -th SIG t -signature σ
If this happens, then F chooses for each so far unused tag t ∈ T i * \ {t
, which guarantees that sufficiently many distinct dummy messages can be chosen.) This defines no more than |T i * | further message-tag-pairs
We do this since F has to re-use an already queried tag for a valid forgery later, and F does not know at this point which tag F is going to use in his forgery later.
Finally, F requests signatures for all message-tag-pairs from its challenger, and receives in return signatures σ ( j) i * for all j, as well as a public key pk . (The number of requested signatures is at most |T i * | + q · l, which can be bounded as claimed using Lemma 3.5.)
F defines pk := (pk , κ) and hands (pk, σ (1) , . . . ,
) to the challenger of the EUF-dnaCMA * m security experiment. This concludes the description of F .
Analysis We now turn to F 's analysis. Let bad abort be the event that F aborts. It is clear that F successfully forges a signature whenever F does so and bad abort does not occur. Note that the dummy messages M are independent of the view of F, thus M * is a dummy message with probability at most |T i * |/(|M k | − m|T i * |). Furthermore, by Lemma 3.5, there is a polynomial p (k) with m|T i * | ≤ p (k). Hence, there is another polynomial p (k), such that the probability that M * is a dummy message is at most p (k)/|M k |. Hence, to prove our theorem, it suffices to show that Pr bad abort ≤ ε/2 + ε PRF + p (k)/|M k |, since this leaves a nonnegligible advantage for F .
First, note that the probability of an (m + 1)-tag collision would be at most ε/2 by (1) if the tags t ( j) i * were chosen truly uniformly and independently from T i * . Now recall that the actual choice of the t
was performed in a way that uses PRF only in a black-box way. Hence, if (m + 1)-tag collisions (and thus bad abort ) occurred significantly more often than with truly uniform tags, we had a contradiction to PRF's pseudorandomness. (Note that this implicitly uses that all messages M j queried by F are distinct and thus lead to different PRF queries.) Concretely, a PRF distinguisher that simulates F until the decision to abort is made shows Pr bad abort ≤ ε/2 + ε PRF + p (k)/|M k |, and thus the theorem.
In order to obtain a fully EUF-CMA secure signature scheme, one may combine our EUF-dnaCMA secure scheme with a suitable chameleon hash function or a one-time signature scheme. This is a very efficient standard construction, see for instance [20, Lemma 2.3] for details. 6 However, we will give more concrete optimized and fully secure schemes later on.
We now turn to the analysis of selecting the challenge index. For this, the following Lemma 3.4 will be helpful. 
is an index that guarantees (1) and
Proof. From Lemma 3.4, we obtain
Furthermore,
which is bounded by a suitable polynomial p (k). 6 Technically, [20, Lemma 2.3] assumes an EUF-naCMA secure scheme (i.e., one which is secure against non-adaptive attacks with not necessarily distinct signed messages). However, it is easy to see that the corresponding reduction to EUF-naCMA security actually leads to a distinct-message attack with overwhelming probability. (In a nutshell, the EUF-naCMA secure scheme is used to sign honestly and independently generated chameleon hash images, resp. signature verification keys. The probability for a collision of two such keys must be negligible by the security of these building blocks). 
Our CDH-Based Scheme
In this section, we construct a fully EUF-CMA-secure signature scheme based on the CDH assumption. We start with constructing a tag-based scheme, which is derived from the stateful CDH-based scheme of Hohenberger and Waters [21] , and prove it EUF-dnaCMA * m -secure. Then, we can apply our generic transformation from Sect. 3 to achieve full EUF-CMA security. Finally, we illustrate some optimizations that allow us to reduce the size of public keys and signatures, for instance, by aggregation. Our scheme is the first fully secure CDH-based signature scheme with such compact public keys. 
CDH Construction
The signature scheme SIG CDH described in Fig. 4 is derived from the CDH-based scheme of [21] , but with two modifications. First, we substitute the implicit chameleon hash function u m v r used in [21] with a product u M = m i=0 u M i i . Second, we omit the w log(t) -factor in the "Boneh-Boyen hash function" which simplifies this part to (z t h) s . From now on, we assume that G and G T are groups of prime order and e : G × G → G T is an efficiently computable nondegenerate bilinear map, i.e., e(g, g) = 1 for g = 1 and e(g a , g b ) = e(g, g) ab for a, b ∈ Z. Our message space in this construction is M = Z p . (Technically, if G is not fixed for a given security parameter, then a fixed message message space can be, e.g., Z 2 , where 2 lower bounds all possible p = |G| for this security parameter.) = (g, g a , u 0 , . . . , u m , z, h ) and implicitly sets the secret key as sk := a. We set r (X ) := m i=0 r i X i so we can write
Signing Now, there are two cases that we have to consider when F asks for a signature on (M i , t i ) .
If t i = t i * and thus M i = M * j for some j = 1, . . . , m i * , then we can compute a valid signature as follows: we choose a random s i ← Z p and set σ i := (σ 1,i ,σ 2,i ), wherẽ
We verify this by using that f (M * j ) = 0, i.e.,
If t i = t i * , then following the original Boneh-Boyen simulation, choose a random s i ← Z p and set
. We compute our valid signature σ i := (σ 1,i ,σ 2,i ) as follows:
Thus, implicitly, we set the randomness
We verify this by showing that
Extract from forgery The adversary F responds with (M * , σ * , t * ) for some tag t * ∈ {t 1 , . . . , t q } and σ * = (σ * 1 ,σ * 2 ). We abort if σ * is not a valid forgery. Otherwise, since the verification equation holds, we have
If t i * = t * , then we abort; otherwise, our guess was correct, and it holds that
Since M * = M * j , we have f (M * ) = 0, and the simulator can compute
Analysis
We show that the adversary F cannot distinguish effectively between the experiment and the simulation. We denote by ε the advantage of the adversary F in the experiment, and by success the event that the simulation outputs a solution g ab . The simulator does not pick (u i ) m i=0 , z, and h at random, but sets them as described above. Since the r i , x z and x h are randomly chosen, this yields the correct distribution, and so the view of the adversary is still the same as in the experiment. The simulator is successful if it does not abort, which means, if it guesses t * correctly and if F is also successful. Hence, we have Pr [success] = ε q .
Optimizations
Now, with this result and our generic transformation from Sect. 3, we can construct a stateless signature scheme, which is proven EUF-dnaCMA secure by Theorem 3.3. Then, we add an explicit chameleon hash function CH (g,w) (M, r ) := g M w r in each instance i = 1, . . . , log c (k) to achieve a fully EUF-CMA-secure signature scheme. This signature scheme does have a constant size public key, but signatures consist of O(log k) group elements, i.e., σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ log k ) where
Now, we concentrate on how we can improve this and achieve constant size signatures. This will be done by aggregation, essentially by multiplying the signatures of each instance similar to [25] . We re-use u 0 , . . . , u m , one sk := a and one randomness s for all instances i (see Fig. 5 ). Unfortunately, we need additional elements in the public key for the aggregation to work. In this sense, our optimization is rather a tradeoff: we prefer constant-size signatures with public keys of logarithmic length over logarithmic-length signatures with constant-size public keys. can be used to solve a CDH challenge with probability at least
where ε PRF and ε CH correspond to the advantages for breaking PRF and CH, respectively.
Proof. We only sketch the proof here, because it is essentially a combination of the proofs from Theorems 4.2 and 3.3. We emphasize the differences and important parts. We have to deal with l = log c (k) instances and obtain our signature by generic aggregation.
Public key setup First, we select an index i * and guess a tag t i * from the corresponding set T i * . Next, we pick a random κ ← {0, 1} k and random distinct M 1 , . . . , M q , r 1 , . . . , r q ← Z p and compute x j = CH(M j , r j ), j ∈ [q]. 7 Due to the collision resistance of our chameleon hash function and the fact that |Z p | > q, we can assume that all x j are distinct; otherwise, we abort. From that, we derive a tag t Signing The adversary will send us messages M 1 , . . . , M q , and we have to compute a valid signature σ ( j) = (σ 1, j ,σ 2, j , r j ) for each of them. We compute r j s.t. x j = CH(M j , r j ). Thus, t 
because we know the exponents x z i and then can aggregate them to get
Extract from forgery The adversary F responds with (M * , σ * ) where σ * = (σ * 1 ,σ * 2 , r * ) and M * = M j for j ∈ [q]. Abort if σ * is not valid. We can assume that F has not produced a collision x * = CH(M * , r * ) = x j for some j ∈ [q] due to the collision resistance of our chameleon hash function. Thus, we have f (x * ) = 0. Now, we compute t * i = PRF
We can compute (g s * )
Therefore, we apply the same method as in Theorem 4.2 since f (x * ) = 0 and t * i * = t i * to extract a solution g ab .
Analysis
The analysis is similar to Theorems 3.3 and 4.2. Hence,
where (*) holds by Lemma 3.5, since we have
. Here, ε PRF is the advantage for a suitable adversary on PRF, and ε CH is the advantage to produce a collision for CH, both negligible in the security parameter.
Our RSA-Based Scheme
In this section, we construct a stateless signature scheme SIG RSA opt secure under the RSA assumption. The result is the most efficient RSA-based scheme currently known.
The prototype for our construction is the stateful RSA-based scheme of Hohenberger and Waters [21] which we reference as SIG RSA HW09 from now on. We first show that a stripped-to-the-basics variation of their scheme (which is tag-based but stateless), denoted SIG RSA , is mildly secure, i.e., EUF-dnaCMA * m -secure. Subsequently, we apply our generic transformation from Sect. 3 and add a chameleon hash to construct a fully secure stateless scheme. Finally, we apply common aggregation techniques which yield the optimized scheme SIG RSA opt .
Preliminaries
RSA(k) is a polynomially bounded function that maps a given security parameter k to the bitlength of the RSA modulus. 
Lemma 5.3. Let π(n)
denote the number of primes p ≤ n. For n ∈ N, n ≥ 2 21 we have
Proof. This lemma is just a variation of the well-known prime bound n ln(n)+2 ≤ π(n) ≤ n ln(n)−4 for n ≥ 55 [29] . We find • n log 2 (n) ≤ n ln(n)+2 since log 2 (n) ≥ ln(n) + 2 for n ≥ 92 ≥ e 2/(log 2 (e)−1) and • n ln(n)−4 ≤ 2n log 2 (n) since ln(n) − 4 ≥ 1 2 log 2 (n) for n ≥ 2 21 ≥ e 8/(2−log 2 (e)) which proves the claim.
Lemma 5.4. For k ∈ N, we define P
Proof.
where P * k is the set of primes p with 2
Proof. For any x ∈ [2 k ], we have |{ p ∈ P * k : p|x}| ≤ 2 since the product of any three elements of P * k is bigger than 2 k . Hence,
(1) by the union bound, (2) by assumption |X | ≤ 2 , (3) by Lemma 5.4.
EUF-dnaCMA * m -Secure Signature Scheme
The basic scheme SIG RSA Let N = P Q be an RSA modulus consistent with the RSA assumption (Definition 5.1). Basically, a SIG RSA signature for a message-tag-pair (M, t)
where p is a prime derived from the tag t. Analogously to our CDH scheme (Sect. 4), we define
to allow for the signing of up to m messages with the same tag. The message space is {0, 1} where we pick = k/ max(2, m) for our realization-we will need later that 1 2 k− is negligible and that m ≤ k. To construct a mapping from tags to primes, we use a technique from [20] and [18] : For a PRF PRF {0,1} RSA(k)
, a corresponding key κ ← {0, 1} k , and a random bitstring b ← {0, 1} RSA(k) , we define where μ t := min{μ ∈ N : PRF {0,1} RSA(k) κ (t||μ) ⊕ b is prime} and || denotes the concatenation of bitstrings. 8 We call μ t the resolving index of t. The complete scheme SIG RSA is depicted in Fig. 6 secure. This includes the chameleon hash (we are in a nonadaptive setting) and logarithmof-tag-construction in the exponent (we guess from a small set of tags only). Our setup of P (κ,b) slightly differs from the one in SIG RSA HW09 since we do need that every tag is mapped to a prime. 
EUF-dnaCMA
where q denotes the number of distinct tags queried by F, and ε PRF and ε PRF are the advantage of suitable distinguishers for the PRF.
Proof. We first describe the simulation and subsequently provide a detailed analysis. In the following (N , e * , y) denotes the RSA challenge given to the simulator. First, we guess an index i * ← [q] for which we suppose F will forge a signature on a new message M * = M i * , but with t * = t i * . The adversary F queries q = q i=1 m i > 0 signatures for messages with tags where q is the number of distinct tags (t i ) i∈[q ] and 8 P (κ,b) (t) can be computed in expected polynomial time but not in strict polynomial time. However, one can simply pick an upper bound μ and set P (κ,b) (t) = p for some arbitrary but fix prime p if μ t > μ for the resolving index of t μ t . For a proper μ the event μ t > μ will only occur with negligible probability (see Theorem 5.6, Game 3). m i the number of messages queried for tag
denotes the list of messages queried for tag t i * .
If e * is not a prime with log 2 (e * ) ≥
, we abort. Otherwise, we proceed as follows: Public key setup We guess an index i * ← [q ] and write t i * for the corresponding tag. Intuitively, t i * is the tag that we will use to embed our challenge. We pick κ and μ * t ← [RSA(k) 2 ] at random and compute b := PRF
, we abort. We compute p i := P (κ,b) (t i ) for i ∈ [q ] and set p * := p i * (note that p * = e * ). Next, we define two polynomials over
, is determined by the messages queried for the challenge tag t i * . We have f (X ) = 
Note that for any message M
We send the public key (N , (u i ) m i=0 , κ, b) to the adversary. Signing For each query (M, t), we compute the corresponding signature σ as follows.
We use the fact that M = M * i for some i ∈ [m] and hence f (M) = 0 to verify
We verify
≡σ .
Finally, we send all signatures to the adversary.
Extract from forgery The adversary responds with (M * , σ * ) where σ * = (σ , t * ) for some tag t * ∈ {t 1 , . . . , t q }. Here, if t * = t i * and if σ * is not a valid forgery, we abort. Otherwise, since the verification equation holds, we have
and hence
to compute x such that x p * ≡ y (mod N ). Since p * = e * by construction, x is the output of the simulator and a solution to the RSA challenge (N , e * , y) was given.
Analysis We show that the adversary F cannot distinguish effectively between the experiment and the simulation. Let X i denote the event that the adversary is successful in Game i.
Game 0 In Game 0, the simulator runs the original EUF-dnaCMA * m experiment, and hence, we have Pr [X 0 ] = ε.
Game 1 In Game 1, the simulator aborts if e * is not a prime with log 2 (e * ) ≥
. Hence, we do not abort with probability
, and Lemma 5.3 (all for sufficiently large N ). Thus,
Game 2
In Game 2, the simulator aborts if t * = t i * , for challenge tag t * and guessed tag t i * . In particular, for given (distinct) tags (t i ) i∈ [q ] , the simulator first chooses an index i * ← [q ] as above. Now, if F outputs a forgery (M * ,σ , t * ) with tag t * = t i * , the simulator aborts. Thus, we have
Game 3
In Game 3, we set up P (κ,b) as described in the simulation above. Concretely,
If μ * t is not the resolving index of P (κ,b) (t i * ), then we abort. We denote this event as abort μ . Assume PRF {0,1} RSA(k) κ is a truly random function. Now, by evaluating P (κ,b) , we derive uniformly random RSA(k)-bit strings. By Lemma 5.3, the probability that the output of P (κ,b) is a RSA(k)-bit prime is at least 1/RSA(k). Further, for RSA(k) 2 P (κ,b) -evaluations, the probability of not outputting a RSA(k)-bit prime is at most (1 − 1/RSA(k)) RSA(k) 2 . Hence, we can construct a PRF distinguisher with probability ε PRF ≥ Pr abort μ
(For a detailed analysis of this Game, see [19] , Proof of Theorem 4.1, Games 8-10. In particular, we have
Game 4 Now, in Game 4, we abort if RSA(k) such primes. Hence, the probability of a collision with e * is at most
. Using this, we can construct an adversary that distinguishes PRF from a truly random function with advantage
. Thus, it follows that
Game 5
In Game 5, we do not pick (u i ) m i=0 at random but set them as described above. Since the β i are randomly chosen and blind the α i known to the adversary, this yields a correct distribution. Hence, we have
The view of the adversary in this Game is exactly the view in the simulation described above.
Game 6 In Game 6, let abort gcd denote the event that gcd( p * , f (M * )) = 1. Remember that messages are bitstrings of length . The range of f is a set X ⊆ [2 k ] containing 2 elements at most. Therefore, by Lemma 5.5 with = k/ max(2, m), we have
and, thus,
Finally, we summarize and see that the simulator is successful with probability at least
Now, by Theorem 5.6, our generic transformation from Sect. 3 applied to SIG RSA yields an EUF-dnaCMA-secure signature scheme. Finally, we use chameleon hashing [23] to generically construct the fully secure scheme SIG RSA gen , like for instance the RSA-based chameleon hash from [20, Appendix C].
Optimizations
The resulting signature scheme of the previous section SIG RSA gen may be EUF-CMA secure but is not very compact yet. In addition to parameters for the chameleon hash, a signature of SIG RSA gen consists of l = log c (k) SIG RSA signatures. This can be improved considerably to constant size signatures by generic aggregation. Figure 7 depicts the resulting scheme SIG RSA opt for the two parameters l (which implicitly contains the granularity parameter c) and m. We still use l tags (intuitively representing the l instances of the original scheme) for signing and verification. However, the public key's size depends only on m (which is a fixed parameter), and the signature size is constant: we need one group element and randomness for the chameleon hash (which is typically also about the size of a group element). In addition to PRF where ε PRF , ε PRF , ε PRF , and ε CH are the success probabilities for breaking PRF and CH, respectively.
Proof. Since the proof is very similar to the combination of proofs Theorems 3.3 and 5.6, we only describe the interesting parts. In addition, we omit the chameleon hash here and prove the EUF-dnaCMA security of the corresponding modified scheme (with x := M instead of x := CH(M, r ) and no randomness for the chameleon hash in the signature). The chameleon hash is then added at the end using generic arguments [23] . Again, w.l.o.g. we assume that the adversary will ask for exactly q > 0 signatures. Setup Analogously to Theorem 3.3, we use the select algorithm to pick an i * . Intuitively, i * represents one of the l instances, and T i * is the set of tags used for this instance. We will embed the challenge only in this instance and simulate all the others.
We start off by picking a random key κ for the PRF PRF. For each queried message (M j ) j∈ [q] , we compute the tags t Next, we embed the challenge exponent. Like in Theorem 5.6, we set up
Finally and analogously to Theorem 5.6, we define two polynomials f and g. For the construction of f , we use the messages M j with t 
where π f is the product of all the primes for all instances computed above omitting occurrences of p * and π g := π f · p * . 
Again, we need gcd( p * , 2π f f (M)) = 1 as a prerequisite for Shamir's trick (Lemma 5.2). We can then compute a solution for the given RSA challenge. Analysis The analysis is very similar to that of Theorem 5.6. The following differences occur:
• The chance for the simulator to guess the tag used for the forgery correctly is
• More primes are computed using P (κ,b) . All of these q · l primes must be distinct from p * . Hence, instead of q in Theorem 5.6, Game 4, we have q · l. However, the relevant probability is still negligible
• There is an additional abort if more than m of the queried messages have the same tag in instance i * . Analogously to Theorem 3.3, we lose ε PRF and ε 2 here. Finally, we generically add a chameleon hash with the techniques of [23] to reach full security which reduces the success negligibly by ε CH (the success of an adversary to produce a collision for the chameleon hash). Hence, the simulator is successful with probability at least
Here, (*) holds; since by Lemma 3.5, we have
Our SIS-Based Scheme
Let us now describe our SIS-based signature scheme. Again, we start with constructing a tag-based signature scheme and prove EUF-dnaCMA * m -security, but only for m = 1. This scheme can be converted into a fully EUF-CMA secure signature scheme by applying the generic transformation from Sect. 3.
Note that in the previous chapters, we have used the character m to denote the number of repeating tags in the EUF-dnaCMA * m security experiment. Unfortunately, the same character is commonly used in lattice-based cryptography to denote the dimension of a matrix Z n×m p . In order to be consistent with the literature, and since we consider only EUF-dnaCMA * Fig. 8 . The tag-based SIS scheme.
6.2. EUF-dnaCMA * 1 -Secure Signature Scheme Our tag-based signature scheme SIG SIS t is described in Fig. 8 . The scheme uses a full-rank difference hash function H : T → Z n×n p , and the tag space is an arbitrary set T such that there exists a such a hash function (e.g., T := Z n p , as in [1] ). We use parameters p, n, m ∈ N, where p is prime, and γ ∈ R, whose choice partially depends on our security analysis and is therefore deferred to Sect. 6.3. Correctness of this scheme follows from Fact 3. Scheme SIG SIS t exhibits many similarities to the identity-key generation algorithm of the IBE scheme from [1] , where our tags correspond to identities of [1] . In the security proof, we simulate signatures in a way very similar to the identity-key generation in [1] , by embedding an additional trapdoor in the matrix G t that allows us to simulate signatures for arbitrary messages and for all tags except for one tag t i = t * which equals the tag from the forgery (M * , t * ) output by the forgery (since the tag-space is polynomially bounded, we can guess t * with nonnegligible probability). To this end, in the simulation matrix, G t is defined such that the additional trapdoor "vanishes" exactly for tag t i = t * .
The difference to the proof from [1] is that we must also be able to issue one signature for message-tag-pair (M i , t i ) with t i = t * , but without knowing any trapdoor. To simulate a signature for this message-tag pair, we define the vector v contained in the public key as v := (A|G t i )e i − U M i for a random short vector e i ← D Z 2m ,γ . Note that this defines v such that e i is a valid signature for message-tag-pair (M i , t i ).
A successful forger F has to produce a forgery e * for a message M * = M i , from which we obtain an equation (A|G t i )e i − U M i = (A|G t i )e * − U M * . By an adequate set-up of matrices G t i and U , this equation allows us to extract a solution to the given SIS problem instance with high probability.
Proof. For simplicity, let us assume a message length with = m. The security proofs works identically for any ∈ [1, m] .
Sim receives as input an SIS-challenge A ∈ Z n×m p , and runs F as a subroutine by simulating the EUF-dnaCMA * 1 -experiment for F. To this end, it proceeds as follows.
In either case, Sim is able to compute a valid and correctly distributed signature for each i ∈ [q], and thus simulates the EUF-dnaCMA * 1 security experiment properly. By assumption, F will thus output (M * , (e * , t * )), where t * = t i for some i ∈ [q] and (e * , t * ) is a valid signature for M * ∈ {M 1 , . . . , M q }, with nonnegligible probability. Extracting the SIS solution Suppose that i = i * , which happens with probability 1/q. Note that in this case it holds that Algorithm Sim computes and outputs e := (ê 1 + R Zê2 + R UM ) as solution to the given SIS challenge. It remains to show that e is sufficiently short and non-zero with high probability.
Note that we have ê 1 ≤ ê ≤ 2 · γ √ m, and similarly ê 2 ≤ 2 · γ √ m. Note furthermore that M ≤ √ m. By [1, Lemma 15] it furthermore holds that R U ≤ 12 √ 2m and R Z ≤ 12 √ 2m, except for a negligibly small probability. In summary, we thus have
Finally, let us show that e = 0 with high probability. Note that we must haveM = M i * − M * = 0 ∈ {−1, 0, 1} m , since M i * = M * . Note furthermore that F does not receive R Z and R U explicitly as input, but only implicitly as (A, AR Z , AR U ).
We will show a slightly stronger result than necessary, namely that even any unbounded algorithm , which receives as input (A, R Z , AR U ) (i.e., R Z in explicit form), will output e 1 ,ê 2 ,M such that e :=ê 1 + R Zê2 + R UM = 0 with significant probability. Since R Z is given explicitly, we may simplify this to Let f A (r ) : {−1, 1} m → Z n p be the map r → Ar . By the pigeonhole principle there are at most p n − 1 vectors r in {−1, 1} m such that the value f A (r ) = Ar ∈ Z n p has a unique preimage. Since r j is chosen uniformly random from {−1, 1} m , the probability that r j is one of those vectors is at most ( p n − 1)/2 m ≤ 2 −m+n log p , which is negligible in n if m ≥ 2n log p.
Thus, with overwhelming probability there exist at least two vectors r j , r j with r j = r j that are consistent with the view of , and thus equally likely, and therefore any algorithm will output (ê 1 ,ê 2 ,M) withê 1 + R Zê2 + R UM = 0 with probability at least 1/2 − 2 −m+n log p .
Selection of Parameters
For the scheme to work correctly, we set n := k, where k is the security parameter. Furthermore, we need to ensure that
• TrapGen can operate, that is, we have m ≥ 6n log p, • γ is chosen such that the sampling algorithms from Facts 2, 4; and 5 produce the required distribution, and that Fact 7 applies, i.e., that γ ≥ m · ω( √ m), • the worst-case to average-case reductions for SIS [15, 26] apply, i.e., we have p ≥ β · ω(n log n), and • the SIS solutions produced in the reduction are sufficiently short, that is, β ≥ O(mγ ).
EUF-CMA-Secure Scheme
By applying the generic transformation from Sect. 3 to our lattice-based EUF-dnaCMA * 1 -secure signature scheme, we obtain EUF-dnaCMA-secure signatures. Concretely, sup- pose we use message space {0, 1} with = m. Then, the resulting EUF-dnaCMA-secure signature scheme has public keys consisting of 4nm+n elements of Z p plus a key κ for the PRF. Signatures consist of l low-norm vectors in Z n p , where l = log c (k) = O(log k) is defined as in Sect. 3. The resulting scheme is depicted in Fig. 9 .
Unfortunately, we are not able to aggregate signatures, like we did for the optimized CDH-and RSA-based constructions, due to the lack of signature-aggregation techniques for lattice-based signatures. We leave this as an interesting open problem.
To obtain a fully EUF-CMA-secure signature scheme, it suffices to combine the scheme from Fig. 9 with a suitable chameleon hash function, like, for instance, the SISbased construction from [8, Sect. 4.1] . This chameleon hash adds another 2mn elements of Z p to the public key, plus one additional low-norm vector e ∈ Z m p to each signature.
